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pression of feeling rather than one of many illustrations of Napoleon's way of "making" history. This question has been revived since the publication in 1902 of Desbrière's *Projets et Tentatives de Débarquement aux Îles Britanniques*, under the auspices of the Historical Section of the French General Staff. From the correspondence there published it does not appear that Napoleon at first thought of Villeneuve's change of course as vitally affecting his scheme. In his letter of September 1, when he had just heard of it, he expresses anxiety mainly about the safety of the Rochefort squadron, which Villeneuve's move southward jeopardized. It should be remembered that for over a week Napoleon had been dispatching troops toward the frontiers of Austria. On August 28 he had written that the army was in full march. The first time he fixes upon Villeneuve the blame for "mon expédition manquée" is in a letter of September 8, and not even then because Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz, but because he had entered Ferrol instead of uniting the squadrons and keeping on into the Channel.

Mention should be made of the serviceable bibliography, filling about fifty pages of the fourth volume. Although it is not intended to be complete, one misses notice of the second edition of Fournier, of Aulard's *French Revolution*, which treats of the Consulate as well as of the earlier period, and of Lanzac de Laborie's *Paris sous Napoléon*.

H. E. BOURNE.

Marschall Bernadotte, Kronprinz von Schweden. Von HANS KLAEBER, Oberstleutnant a. D. (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. 1910. Pp. x, 482.)

THIS volume is practically a biography of Bernadotte, for its scope is not limited to the eight years when he was prince royal of Sweden, as 270 of its 466 pages of text deal with his career prior to 1810, while the twenty-six years of his kingship were of the proverbially happy sort which have no annals. The limitation of the book is not primarily in scope but in character, for it is distinctly a military biography.

The book is well printed and amply illustrated with an admirable selection of portraits, photographs of buildings and scenes, reproductions of prints and documents, and an abundance of useful sketch-maps illustrating the military operations. Unfortunately there is neither an analytical table of contents nor an index.

The ten-page *Verzeichnis der benutzten Druckwerke* makes no pretense of being an exhaustive bibliography, for it even omits the biographies by Touchard-Lafosse (Paris, 1838) and Swederus (Stockholm, 1877-1878) which are cited in the foot-notes. Many titles lack the place and date of publication, and rarely is any distinction made between trifling monographs and works in several volumes. The foot-notes seldom, if ever, give exact citation of volume and page. Aside from acknowledgments, in the introduction, to the General Staff in Berlin and

to the archives in Dresden and Stockholm, there is little evidence of the use of new manuscript materials, but the author has verified many facts of a geographical and antiquarian character, and corrected several discrepancies in dates which have led previous writers into errors of a more serious sort. The narrative is frequently enlivened with extracts, in German translation, from Bernadotte's correspondence and conversations, mostly borrowed from earlier publications.

Bernadotte's share in each campaign from the outbreak of the war between France and Austria in 1792 through the campaign in Norway in 1814 receives due consideration; but to the campaigns of 1813 more than a hundred pages are allotted, showing that the author's chief interest is centred on the great year of the *Freiheitskrieg*, for which he makes liberal use of the works by Lagerhjelm (Stockholm, 1891), Wiehr (Berlin, 1893), and Friederich (Berlin, 1903-1906), and cites several other recent monographs. In general, considerable use is made of the older biographies by Geijer (Stockholm, 1844) and Sarrans (Paris, 1845) and of the more recent one by Schefer (Paris, 1899). The literature in German, both general and monograph, seems to have been more thoroughly worked over than that in French and Swedish. Pingaud's *Bernadotte, Napoléon et les Bourbons* (Paris, 1901) is mentioned in the bibliography, but even this honor is denied to the studies on the embassy to Vienna by Masson (Paris, 1883) and Casati (Paris, 1898) and on the foreign policy of Bernadotte from 1810 to 1815 by Alin (Stockholm, 1899).

The style is simple and straightforward, even tending to monotony and, at times, to a failure to differentiate sufficiently the important facts. In his judgments and in his general avoidance of the expression of personal opinion, the writer has fairly conformed to his professions of impartiality; but in method and content every page seems to exhibit the traits of the German military officer. The author's conception of Bernadotte is very definite and reasonable, but it underlies the treatment of facts rather than emerges as a resultant explanation of them. He discovers three phases to Bernadotte's career: without Napoleon till 1796, with Napoleon from 1796 to 1810, against Napoleon after 1810; but he is obliged to confess that this key is too simple to unlock the mystery of Bernadotte's character and actions. Clearly Oberstleutnant Klaeber, though sympathetic to his subject, finds difficulty in comprehending the native of Pau and the republican, who was ill concealed by the titles of marshal of the empire and prince royal of Sweden. What a puzzle would he find Pau's other great son, Henry of Navarre!

GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER.